Summary
A credential-harvesting kit impersonating a login portal, distributed via email with a PDF attachment linking to a lookalike domain. The kit fingerprints visitors and redirects automated scanners to a benign page, which is the detail worth building a hunt around.
Indicators
| type | value | notes |
|---|---|---|
| domain | login-secure-update[.]example | lookalike, registered <30 days before use |
| domain | cdn-assets-update[.]example | hosts kit JS/CSS |
| ip | 203.0.113.42 | hosting, shared with ~12 other lookalike domains |
| ip | 198.51.100.17 | SMTP relay used for delivery |
| sha256 | REPLACE_WITH_REAL_HASH | landing page JS bundle |
Techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)
| id | technique |
|---|---|
| T1566.001 | Phishing: spearphishing attachment |
| T1204.002 | User execution: malicious file |
| T1583.001 | Acquire infrastructure: domains |
| T1185 | Browser session hijacking (credential capture) |
Detection & hunting notes
This is the section that actually helps another defender. Be specific: a string to grep for in proxy logs, a JA3/JA3S fingerprint, a registrar pattern, a TLS certificate issuer used across the cluster, a delay-based anti-sandbox check in the kit's JS. A vague "block these IOCs" is far less useful than "here's the pivot that finds the next ten domains in this cluster."
Sources
[ List where this came from — a sandbox run, a tip, passive DNS, a takedown report you read. Cite specifically; it's what makes a writeup verifiable rather than just asserted. ]